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In order to understand the question of justice in the EU we need to draw a distinction
between two domains of justice: constitutional justice and justice in resources.
Constitutional justice is that which applies to the basic institutions of a political
community. It deals with the ways in which persons are related to each other as
citizens, i.e. as agents that share in the exercise of power. Constitutional justice
requires us to set up institutions that treat everyone as free and equal members
of a political community. By contrast, justice in resources, which can be either
distributive or corrective justice, concerns the way in which goods, services, risks
and opportunities are distributed within a given society.
Constitutional justice is prior and fundamental. Whatever distribution of resources
is achieved through illegitimate methods, however benign and egalitarian it may be,
suffers the stain of fundamental injustice. Corrupt courts and absolute monarchs
cannot be legitimate decision makers and cannot produce just results, even if the
substance of their decisions appears to be fair. This is why modern democracies
set out matters of constitutional law as issues of moral and legal priority. Such
matters are protected by a written constitution or clear constitutional guidelines
and through the force and powers of jurisdiction. The separation of powers, the
independence of the judiciary, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and
all associated principles of public law are the essential ingredients of any legitimate
political structure.
The second domain of justice, justice in resources, follows in the footsteps of
constitutional justice: all the institutions of distribution are subject to the rules
about law, adjudication and jurisdiction set out by constitutional rules. Although it
is possible to imagine that some distribution will be seen to be just or fair, there is
no way in which persons can have clear and just relations with others unless they
know that they have equal standing before the law and before lawful officials, e.g.
judges, or law-makers. In other words, without the assurance that a constitutional
system of jurisdiction gives about the enforcement, publicity and legitimacy of laws
and decisions, no system of justice in resources can be just. So the two domains are
distinct, but closely interconnected.
The problem with the EU is that we have not yet settled what form of institutional
arrangement the principles of constitutional justice require. It is clear that Member
Stats remain the main constitutional systems of jurisdiction – and the Treaty
recognises that. But at the same time, supremacy and direct effect transfer many
of these powers to the EU. So we are still at a loss when we ask the question, ‘is
there a democratic deficit?’ We are still not sure if, and to what extent, the ordinary
principles of democracy apply to the EU. Larry Siedentop believes there is such a
deficit. Andrew Moravcsik denies that.
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This is very important for the institutional design of the EU. For example, if there
was a single all powerful legislative chamber elected through elections throughout
Europe, would that be more or less democratic? Any proportional such system
would eliminate the influence of small states over their own government – at least
compared to the present state of play.
The uncertainty about the appropriate theory of institutions for the EU – and the
currently inconclusive debate between federalists and internationalists – does not
mean that the constitutional architecture of the EU and the member states is unjust.
It may be that we are not sure how to explain our intuitions – hence we often talk
of a ‘sui generis’ entity – yet one possible outcome is constitutionally the EU is not
unjust. It may be that it strikes the right balance between central institutions and self-
government, or between principles of representation and accountability. We all of
course think of improvements, but this does not mean that the current structure is
illegitimate.
One area where all these issues are relevant to current problems is the crisis of the
Eurozone. Whatever the general theory of the constitutional justice of the EU, the
crisis has created new institutional forms that has challenged the standard picture.
For example, one the most influential institutions in Europe today is the Eurogroup.
It remains, however, an informal meeting of ministers and its decisions are not
subject to ordinary processes of accountability such as parliamentary scrutiny.
The European Central Bank has acted both as regulator and lender for some of
the countries that have entered a bail-out programme. So the Eurozone crisis has
created new constitutional questions.
But most importantly, the Eurozone crisis has raised serious concerns about injustice
in the distribution of resources, burdens and risks. The functioning of the Eurozone
has had great unintended consequences. In the past five years five member states
have needed assistance of one kind or another (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain
and Cyprus) and are going through painful adjustment. This shows that the problem
is systemic, not particular to each one of them.
The problems in the design of the Eurozone, which is not an ‘optimal currency union’
are well known. The Eurozone lacks a common fiscal power and it also lacks the
automatic stabilisers that other currency unions apply among their various regions,
such as federal unemployment and housing benefits, shared healthcare costs, the
pooling of bank risks and deposit insurance and the availability of a lender of last
resort. The Eurozone also lacks, mostly due to language and regulatory barriers,
the easy movement of workers across state borders seen in the United States.
The Eurozone is thus a highly unfair economic and monetary union. It exposes its
member states to great flows of finance and trade that can easily destabilise them. It
then magnifies disproportionately the consequences of failure, by preventing states
from using monetary or fiscal policy for a soft landing when they need it.
The winners, by contrast, have enjoyed extraordinary benefits. Germany has
enjoyed low interest rates and a fixed exchange rate between itself and its major
European markets, with whom it trades freely because of the institutions of the
internal market. This means that its export boom has not been offset by a rise in its
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currency. If Germany had been outside the euro, currency appreciation would have
hurt its exports dramatically. But this cannot happen inside the Eurozone. So the
institutional design harms the economies of the periphery for the benefit of those of
the centre.
Germany’s political class seems happily oblivious to the unfairness of the Eurozone.
It refuses to play its part in correcting the trade imbalances with its partners and
appears committed to the fiction that fair competition exists between firms in
Germany and firms in the periphery that have no access to banking finance nor the
economic or political stability that could bring them any investment. The German
constitutional court has even declared (in its 2014 outright monetary transactions
judgment) that ignoring the consequences of Germany’s policies outside Germany
is some kind of ‘constitutional duty’. It has dressed up conservative policy as legal
doctrine.
The legacy of the Euro in many of the peripheral states is economic implosion,
rising inequality, widespread corruption and dramatic loss of trust in democracy and
the EU. This is not the result of isolated domestic failures, although these are real
enough. It is also a result of collective decision-making that completely misjudged
the Eurozone’s design and its possible effects. These are all serious injustices, both
in terms of resources but also in terms of constitutional design. We have created a
trade and monetary union where the risks, burdens and benefits of our cooperation
are distributed very unfairly and very unevenly among its members. The design
works for the stronger economies, but not for the weaker ones.
This is collective problem, which can only have a collective solution. The most urgent
problem of justice in Europe in my opinion, is the unfair structure of the Eurozone.
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